Abstract: This paper investigates the equilibrium interactions between trading targets and private information in a multi-period Kyle (1985) market. There are two investors who each follow dynamic trading strategies: A strategic portfolio rebalancer who engages in order splitting to reach a cumulative trading target and an unconstrained strategic insider who trades on long-lived information. We consider cases in which the constrained rebalancer is partially informed as well as the special case in which the rebalancer is ex ante uninformed. We derive a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium, describe an algorithm for computing such equilibria, and present numerical results on properties of these equilibria.
Introduction
Price discovery and liquidity in financial markets arise from the interactions of different investors with different information and trading motives using a variety of order execution strategies.
2 An important insight from Akerlof (1970) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Kyle (1985) , and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is that trading noise plays a critical role in markets subject to adverse selection when some investors trade on superior private information. However, orders from investors with noninformational reasons to trade also presumably reflect optimizing behavior such as minimizing trading costs, optimizing hedging objectives, and other portfolio structuring objectives. Moreover, while informed and uninformed investors trade differently, the opportunities available to them for how to trade are presumably similar. Our paper is the first to model optimal dynamic trading by both informed and rebalancing investors without exogenous restrictions on information life and trading strategies. We specifically investigate a multi-period Kyle (1985) market in which there are two strategic investors with different trading motives who each follow optimal but different dynamic trading strategies. One investor is the standard strategic informed investor with long-lived information. The other investor is a strategic portfolio rebalancer who can trade over multiple rounds to minimize the cost of hitting a terminal trading target. In addition, the model has noise traders and competitive market makers. In our model, the informed investor's orders are masked by two types of trading noise over time: Independently and identically distributed noise trader orders and correlated randomness in the optimally chosen orders submitted by the rebalancer with the trading target.
Our main results are:
• Sufficient conditions for a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium are characterized for this market.
• An algorithm for computing such equilibria numerically is provided.
• The presence of the rebalancer introduces several new features: (i) the order flow is autocorrelated, (ii) the insider and the rebalancer both trade (in expectation) in a U -shaped pattern (Kyle's insider trades in a monotonically increasing fashion), and (iii) the price impact of the order flow is S-shaped with initial price impacts above those in Kyle and later price impacts below Kyle's.
• The rebalancer sometimes buys/sells more than his ultimate target and then partially unwinds his position at the end to achieve his trading target. This reflects the fact that the rebalancer's trading is driven both by rebalancing motives and by minimizing trading costs and profiting from any private information that he acquires endogenously over time through the trading process.
Our analysis integrates two literatures on pricing and trading. The first is research on price discovery. Kyle (1985) described equilibrium pricing and dynamic trading in a market with noise traders and a single investor who has long-lived private information. Subsequent work by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , Foster and Viswanathan (1996) , and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) extended the model to allow for multiple informed investors with long-lived information.
A second literature studies optimal dynamic order execution for uninformed investors with trading targets. This work includes Bertsimas and Low (1998), Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000) , Gatheral and Scheid (2011) , Engel, Ferstenberg, and Russell (2012) and Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011) on optimal dynamic order execution with trading targets and Bunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) on predatory trading in response to predictable uninformed trading. This research all takes the price impact function for orders as exogenous. In contrast, we model optimal order execution in an equilibrium setting that endogenizes the price impact of orders and that reflects, in particular, the impact of strategic uninformed trading on price impacts. 3 Models combining both informed trading and optimized rebalancing have largely been restricted to static settings or to multi-period settings with short-lived information and/or exogenous restrictions on the rebalancer's trading strategies. Admati and Pfleider (1988) study a dynamic market consisting of a series of repeating oneperiod trading rounds with short-lived information and uninformed liquidity traders who only trade once but decide when to time their trading. An exception is Seppi (1990) who models an informed investor and an uninformed strategic investor with a trading target in a market in which both can trade dynamically. His model is solved for separating and partial pooling equilibria with upstairs block trading, but only for a restricted set of particular model parameterizations.
Our paper is related to Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (DJK 2014). Both their paper and our analysis model dynamic order splitting by an uninformed investor in a multi-period market. However, the informed investors in DJK have short-lived private information (i.e., they only have one chance to trade on high-frequency value innovations before they become public) whereas our insider has long-lived information (i.e., our insider can trade over multiple intra-day periods, even if the periods are short). Both papers have autocorrelated (predictable) order flows because of the dynamic rebalancing. Order flow autocorrelation is empirically significant but absent in previous Kyle models. 4 However, there are several important differences between our work and DJK. First, we show that the zero price impact of predictable orders is robust to dynamic informed trading. In particular, our informed insider trades dynamically whereas the DJK informed traders are, by assumption, unable to trade predictably over time. Our analysis is possible because we use the approach of Foster and Vishwanathan (1996) to circumvent the large state space problem mentioned in DJK. This means that our rebalancer's orders depend dynamically on the realized path of aggregate orders as well as on the rebalancing target. In contrast, the rebalancer in DJK is only allowed to trade deterministically over time. Secondly, we derive intertemporal price impacts and order flow patterns that differ from those in both Kyle and in DJK.
Model
We model a multi-period discrete-time market for a risky stock. A trading day is normalized to the interval [0, 1] during which there are N ∈ N time points at which trade can occur where ∆ := 1 N > 0 is the time step. As in Kyle (1985) , the stock's true valueṽ becomes publicly known at time N + 1 after the market closes at the end of the day. The valueṽ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 v . Additionally, there is a money market account that pays a zero interest rate.
Four types of investors trade in our model:
1. An informed trader (who we will call the insider) knows the true stock value 4 For empirical evidence on order flow autocorrelation, see Hasbrouck (1991a,b) and also the related empirical references in Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014).
ṽ at the beginning of trading and has zero initial positions in both the stock and the money market account. The insider is risk-neutral and maximizes the expected value of her final wealth. The insider's order for the stock at time n, n = 1, ..., N , is denoted by ∆θ I n where θ I n is her accumulated total stock position at time n.
2. A constrained investor needs to rebalance his portfolio by buying or selling stock to reach a terminal trading target constraintã on his ending stock position θ R N by the close of the trading day. He starts the day with zero initial positions in both the stock and the money market account. 5 The targetã is jointly normally distributed withṽ. The variableã has zero-mean and variance σ 2 a and a correlation ρ ∈ [0, 1] with the stock valueṽ. When ρ is 0, the rebalancer is initially uninformed. However, if ρ > 0, then we can think of the rebalancer as being initially informed aboutṽ but subject to random binding risk limits. 6 The rebalancer is risk-neutral and maximizes the expected value of his final wealth subject to the terminal stock position constraint. The rebalancer's order for the stock at time n, n = 1, ..., N , is ∆θ R n , and the terminal constraint requires ∆θ
3. Noise traders submit net orders for stock at times n, n = 1, ..., N , that are exogenously given by Brownian motion increments ∆w n . These increments are normally distributed with zero-mean and variance V[∆w n ] = σ 2 w ∆ for a constant σ w > 0. We assume that w is independent ofṽ andã.
4. Competitive risk-neutral market makers observe the aggregate net order flow y n at times n, n = 1, ..., N , where
where σ(y 1 , ..., y n ) is the sigma-algebra generated by the order flow history.
The constrained rebalancer's presence is the main difference between our setting and Kyle (1985) as well as the multi-agent settings in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) . As we shall see, the rebalancer's presence produces new stylized features, such as autocorrelated order flow, relative to the existing models.
Because all initial positions are assumed to be zero (i.e., θ I 0 = θ R 0 = 0), the insider chooses orders ∆θ I n ∈ σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) at times n, n = 1, 2, ..., N, to maximize
On the other hand, the rebalancer faces the terminal constraint θ R N =ã. Therefore, he submits orders ∆θ R n ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) at times n, n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, to maximize . As proven in the appendix, the insider's problem (2.3) and the rebalancer's problem (2.4) are both quadratic optimization problems. Definition 2.1. A Baysian Nash equilibrium is a collection of random variables 
(ii) given {θ I n , p n }, the strategy θ R n solves the rebalancer's problem (2.4): To clarify this definition, we recall the Doob-Dynkin lemma: For any random variable B and any σ(B)-measurable random variable A we can find a deterministic function f such that A = f (B). Therefore, we can write θ R n = f R n (ã, y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ), θ I n = f I n (ṽ, y 1 , . . . , y n ), and p n = f p n (y 1 , . . . , y n ) for three deterministic functions f R n , f I n , and f p n . In (i), (ii), and (iii) we then mean that the functions f R n , f I n , and f p n are fixed whereas the random variables y 1 , ..., y n vary with the controls θ I and θ R .
In what follows, our goal is to construct a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which (i) the insider's and rebalancer's trading strategies take the forms: 
where λ n , µ n are constants, and (iii) where the process q n has the dynamics ∆q n = r n y n + s n q n−1 , q 0 := 0, (2.10)
for constants r n and s n , n = 1, 2, ..., N . The rebalancer and insider are not restricted to use linear strategies like (2.7) and (2.8). However, we will prove that they optimally choose such strategies in the equilibrium we construct. The rebalancer's trading target necessitates the introduction of the process q n which is our model's main new feature. Much like p n is a state variable giving the market maker beliefs about the stock valuation, q n is a state variable indicating market maker beliefs about the rebalancer's remaining trading given the prior trading history. There are two things to note about q n . First, the rebalancer's trade at each time n is not a deterministic function of his targetã. Rather, his trades also depend on the realized prior order flow history as reflected in q n . This is in contrast to the deterministic trades the rebalancer is constrained to use in Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014). Second, if equations (2.7) through (2.10) define a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then the same equilibrium (with the same prices and orders) is obtained if r n and s n are replaced with xr n and xs n and µ n , α L n , and α I n are replaced with µ n /x, α R n /x, and α I n /x for any scaler x > 0. Thus, in the equilibrium considered below, we normalize r n and s n so that q n is the market makers' estimate of the rebalancer's remaining demandã − θ R n at time n based on the observed history of aggregate orders
The termã − θ R n−1 in (2.7) plays two roles in the rebalancer's strategy. It is the distance between the rebalancer's current position and his final trading targetã, and, in equilibrium, it is also private information about possible misvaluation of the stock valueṽ − p n−1 :
The first equality follows from q n−1 ∈ σ(y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) and θ R n−1 ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ). The second equality follows from the independence betweenṽ − p n−1 and y 1 , ..., y n−1 as well as the independence betweenã − θ R n−1 − q n−1 and y 1 , ..., y n−1 . Thus,ã is, in general, incrementally informative aboutṽ beyond the past order flow history. In particular, it is informative at n > 1 even if ρ = 0.
Similarly, the termṽ − p n−1 in (2.8) plays two roles in the insider's strategy. It is both private information about the stock value and, in equilibrium, informative about the remaining demandã − θ R n−1 for the rebalancer:
The first equality follows from q n−1 , p n−1 ∈ σ(y 1 , ..., y n−1 ). The second equality follows from the independence betweenṽ − p n−1 and y 1 , ..., y n−1 as well as the independence betweenã − θ R n−1 − q n−1 and y 1 , ..., y n−1 .
Equilibrium
In this section we characterize sufficient conditions for existence of a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the form in (2.7) through (2.10). The characterization follows the logic of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) closely. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the steps we use to describe sufficient equilibrium conditions.
Set of possible coefficients
Set of "hat" processes Set of Kalman filter coefficients
Set of FOC coefficients
Fixed point requirement for a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium Figure 1 : Venn diagrams illustrating the various constants entering the fixed point which describes the Baysian Nash equilibrium.
To begin, we consider the complete set of all possible candidate values for the equilibrium constants
with
The restrictions in (2.15) at date N reflect the fact that the rebalancer must achieve his targetã after his last round of trade. Our goal is to identify sufficient conditions for a candidate set of specific coefficient values to be an equilibrium. We do this in three steps. The first step takes a set of candidate constants (2.14)-(2.15) and computes (using the terminology and notation of Foster and Viswanathan 1996) a corresponding system of "hat" price and order flow processes
The system of processes (∆p n , ∆q n ,ŷ n , ∆θ I n , ∆θ R n ) is fully specified (autonomous) by the coefficients (2.14)-(2.15). Furthermore, given the zero-mean and joint normality ofṽ,ã, and w, the "hat" system is also zero-mean and jointly normal. We define the variances and covariance for the "hat" dynamics, n = 2, ..., N , by
where the initial variances and covariance at n = 1 are
The "hat" processes will be used to make (2.3) and (2.4) analytically tractable in the sense that both the insider's problem and the rebalancer's problem can be described by a five-dimensional state process; see (2.33) and (2.36) below. In particular, the "hat" processes denote the processes that agents believe other agents believe describe the equilibrium. In equilibrium, these beliefs must be correct. This consistency requirement imposes two groups of conditions that a set of candidate constants must satisfy to be equilibrium constants. The next two steps explain these conditions. The second step requires the coefficients, λ n , µ n , s n , and r n , of the price and order flow state variable processes to be consistent in equilibrium with Bayesian updating.
In particular, if market makers believe that the insider and rebalancer are following the "hat" strategies, then we can re-write (2.2) as ∆p n = λ n y n − E[y n |σ(y 1 , ..., y n−1 )]
for n = 1, ..., N . The first equality follows from the fact that, given the jointly Gaussian structure of the "hat" processes, conditional expectations are linear projections. The second equality follows from (i) the definition of the aggregate order flow, (ii) the fact thatṽ −p n−1 is independent of past order flows, and (iii) the assumption that the noise trader orders are zero-mean and i.i.d over time. The final equality follows from the assumption in our conjectured equilibrium that p n is linear in q n−1 and the normalization that q n−1 = E[ã −θ R n−1 |σ(y 1 , ..., y n−1 )]. Comparing the last line of (2.25) with (2.9) and using the fact that λ n equals the projection coefficient
gives restrictions on the coefficients of the price process in terms of the insider and rebalancer strategy coefficients. A similar logic can also be used to derive restrictions on the coefficients of the q n process in terms of the investor strategy coefficients. Thus, these calculations lead to four restrictions on the state-variable and strategy constants in a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium for n = 1, ..., N : Condition 2.2. In equilibrium, the price and order flow state variable coefficients depend on the insider and rebalancer order coefficients as follow:
28)
where the conditional variances and covariance from (2.21)-(2.23) can now be explic-itly specified as (see the proof of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1)
Note that Condition 2.2 has a "block" structure. The variances and covariance Σ (1) n , Σ (2) n , and Σ (3) n at time n just depend on prior coefficients and prior variances and covariance from time n − 1. The values of λ n and r n just depend on the β R n and β I n strategy coefficients and the variances and covariance at time n (along with the exogenous noise trading variance σ 2 w ). Lastly, µ n and s n depend on λ n and µ n and the full set of strategy coefficients at time n.
The third step begins by deriving value functions for the optimization problems for the two strategic investors. Consider first the insider at a generic time n. Given her trades ∆θ I 1 , . . . , ∆θ I n -which need not be consistent with the candidate "hat" dynamics -the insider not only knows the final stock valueṽ, but also the extent to which the actual prices and rebalancer's order flow at date n deviate from the values they would have had if she had instead traded as in the candidate "hat" processes. Thus, the state variables at date n for the insider's value function are
Here the "un-hatted" variables are the variable values given her actual (potentially arbitrary) orders, see (2.9) and (2.10), whereas the "hat" variables are not affected by actual orders. When the rebalancer's strategy is taken to be fixed by (2.7), it is characterized by the two sequences of candidate constants β
However, even though the rebalancer's strategy is fixed, its realizations are subject to the insider's choice of control θ I since the aggregate order flow affects the rebalancer's actual orders. Thus, the state variable X
n measures the effect of the insider's actual orders on the rebalancer's actual orders. A similar interpretation applies to X (4) n and X (5) n and the order flow state variable q n and prices p n . In equilibrium, we will see that the three deviation state variables X (3) , X (4) , and X (5) are zero. However, in deriving the equilibrium, we need to allow for the possibility of past suboptimal play.
We show (see the appendix) that the insider's value function for n = 0, 1, ..., N has a quadratic form
where I (0) n and I
(i,j) n are coefficients computed recursively from the candidate coefficients (2.14)-(2.15). We use the Bellman principle to derive the value function coefficients at time n (i.e., I
(0) n and I (i,j) n ) in terms of the value function coefficients at time n + 1. The next section describes this recursion in detail.
Similarly, when the insider's strategy is given by (2.8), an analogous argument can be used to derive a quadratic value function for the rebalancer
Here the state variables are
given a prior sequence of (potentially off-equilibrium) trades ∆θ
are again computed recursively from the candidate coefficients (2.14) and (2.15). In equilibrium, the deviation state variables Y (3) , Y (4) , and Y (5) are again zero.
The first-and second-order conditions for the insider's and rebalancer's maximization problems, given the insider's and rebalancer's value functions, lead to a group of equilibrium restrictions on the investor strategy coefficients β 
In addition, for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, given the variances and covariance Σ
(1)
n , Σ
n , the candidate coefficients in (2.14)-(2.15) solve the following four polynomial equations:
where the I and L terms are from the two investor value functions (2.34) and (2.35). The candidate constants and the value function terms must also satisfy the two inequalities:
which (as we show in the appendix) ensure sufficiency of the first-order-conditions. ♦ Here again, the equilibrium restrictions have a "block" structure in that α I n and α R n in (2.40) and (2.41) depend on β I n and β R n , whereas the linear equations (2.38) and (2.39) -which are the first-order conditions for the insider and rebalancer at date n -can be solved to express β I n and β R n in terms of the current updating coefficients and value function coefficients (which only depend on the updating and strategy coefficients at later dates) but not on α I n and α R n . Our main theoretical result is the following: Theorem 2.4. If the constants (2.14) and (2.15) satisfy Conditions 2.2 and 2.3, then a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists of the form given in equations (2.7)-(2.10). Furthermore, we have
The new feature in our model, compared to Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Kyle (1985) , is the presence of the q n process in the equilibrium price dynamics (2.9). This produces new stylized features including autocorrelation of the equilibrium aggregate order flow:
which, in general, is not zero. The second equality uses the fact from Theorem 2.4 that α I n = 0. The last equality follows, in part, from the earlier observation that, in equilibrium q n−1 is the conditional expectation ofã − θ R n−1 given the prior trading history.
Algorithm
This section describes an algorithm for searching numerically for a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is similar in logic to the algorithm in Section V in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) , except that our algorithm requires three constants as inputs (due to the presence of two strategic agents) whereas Foster and Viswanathan (1996) only requires one constant as an input.
To describe the algorithm we assume that the conclusions of Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.4 (see the appendix) are valid. The algorithm starts by taking as inputs three conjectured constants:
and proceeds through backward induction. 
, be the coefficients appearing in the two representations:
Induction step: At each time n the algorithm takes the following constants as input:
Given these constants, (λ n , r n , β
n ) must satisfy (2.26)-(2.27), (2.38)-(2.39), and (2.30)-(2.32). This gives a system of seven polynomial equations in seven unknown constants. Given a solution to these seven equations, we obtain (µ n , s n , α I n , α R n ) from (2.28), (2.29), (2.40), and (2.41). Next, to compute the coefficients in the value functions at time n − 1; that is,
we consider the following two optimization problems:
According to Lemma A.2, the insider's problem (2.52) is quadratic in ∆θ I n whereas Lemma A.4 ensures that the rebalancer's problem (2.53) is quadratic in ∆θ R n . The first-order-condition produces the candidate optimizer for the insider's order ∆θ
where
n := 
Again, (2.43) ensures that this candidate optimizer indeed maximizes the rebalancer's objective. We also note that (2.39) and (2.40) come from (2.61) and (2.62) when the equilibrium conditions δ 
the algorithm terminates and the computed coefficients produce a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we adjust the conjectured starting input values in (2.46) and start the algorithm all over.
Numerical results
As is common with multi-period Kyle-type models, we do not have analytic comparative results about the properties of our model. However, we have conducted a variety of numerical experiments to compute properties of the model. The baseline specification for our model has N = 10 rounds of trading, the variance of the terminal stock valueṽ is normalized to σ The two graphs in Figure 2 show the price impact of order flow parameter λ n over time n. The various dashed lines are for different parameterizations of our model. For comparison, the solid (blue) line is the corresponding price impact parameter in Kyle (1985) in which the rebalancer is absent. Relative to Kyle (1985) , there is an S-shaped trajectory in the price impact of order flow due to the presence of the rebalancer. In the first round of trading at time n = 1, prices respond more to order flow than in Kyle. However, at later times n > 2, prices respond less than in Kyle. The price impact in our model is also in contrast to Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014) who have price impacts that follow an inverted U -shape (see their Figure 1 ).
The right graph in Figure 2 varies the variance of the trading target σ 2 a . That causes the twist in λ n over time to become even greater. When the trading target variance σ 2 a is high enough, the price impact of order flow can even be non-monotone over time (see the dashed line corresponding to a trading target variance σ 2 a = 3.7 comparable to the total daily noise trader order variance σ 2 w = 4). The left graph varies the correlation ρ between the terminal stock valueṽ and the trading target a. Here again, we see an asymmetric impact of ρ over time relative to our baseline model with ρ = 0. At early times, λ n is increasing in the correlation ρ, but at later times, λ n is decreasing in ρ. n ofṽ − p n−1 over time. We see that public uncertainty aboutṽ falls faster in our model than in Kyle's model when ρ > 0. This is due, in part, to the fact that, with ρ > 0, the rebalancer also trades on information which is imperfectly correlated with the stock valueṽ over time. However, when ρ = 0, our model's stock value variance trajectory is close to the corresponding trajectory in Kyle. In this case, when ρ = 0, rebalancing noise does not have a significant impact on the speed of price discovery unless σ Figure 4 shows the insider's strategy coefficient β I n , which measures how aggressively she trades on her private informationṽ − p n−1 over time n.
9 As in Kyle, the intensity of informed trading also increases in our model as time approaches the terminal time N . This is consistent with the fact that the price impact of order flow λ n in Figure 2 shrinks as time passes. We also see that as the variance of the trading target σ 2 a increases, the informed investor trades more aggressively at early dates, less so in the middle, and then slightly more aggressively again close to the terminal time N . The informed trader's increased initial aggressiveness reflects the fact that there is more noise, due to the rebalancer's trading targetã, in which to hide the informed trader's orders. In addition, if ρ > 0, insider trading aggressiveness increases somewhat due to a Holden-Subrahmanyam race-to-trade competition effect. The apparent size of the changes in β I 1 -which are on the order of 10 percent -are visually understated in Figure 4 because of the vertical scaling (due to the size of β I 10 ). In the next figure, we will see that the impact of these changes on order size is material. Figure 5 shows the insider's expected trades over the day for the specific value realizationṽ = 1 and averaged overã and w. Kyle's model produces the solid (blue) line whereas the dotted lines represent varies values of ρ (the correlation betweenṽ 9 Recall that α I n = 0 so the state variable q n has no direct impact on the insider's orders. andã). Unlike in Kyle's model, our model produces a U -shaped trading pattern; that is, our insider expects to trade more initially and much more at the end of the day relative to the middle of the day. Since the expectations depicted in Figure 5 are linear in the realization ofṽ, there is also a U -shaped expected informed trading pattern for other realizations ofṽ as well. Figure 6 shows the trajectories of the strategy coefficients, β R n and α R n , for the rebalancer. These patterns reflect the influence of multiple considerations on the rebalancer's trading. First, the rebalancer needs to reach his trading targetã at time N at the lowest cost possible. Since expected order flow has no price impact (see (2.25)), the rebalancer trades at early dates, in part, to signal the total amount he needs to trade later in the day. To the extent that randomness from the insider and noise trader orders cause errors in the market maker's order flow expectations, the rebalancer does additional trading over time to adjust the market maker's future order flow expectations. Second, the rebalancer also trades over time to profit from information about the stock value. In particular, if ρ > 0, the rebalancer starts out with stock valuation information. However, even if the rebalancer is ex ante uninformed aboutṽ (i.e., ρ = 0), he still acquires stock valuation information over time (see (2.12)) which he can use to reduce his rebalancing costs and even, possibly, to earn a trading profit. By adding and subtracting β R n to the coefficient α R n in the second term in (2.7) and rearranging, we can decompose the rebalancer's order at time n as follows:
The second component, (α R n + β R n )q n−1 , is the market maker's expectation of the rebalancer's order at time n. This is the amount the rebalancer trades at time n with no price impact. The first component, β R n (ã − θ R n−1 − q n−1 ), represents the combined effect of i) strategic trading by the rebalance on his private information,ã−θ R n−1 −q n−1 , which is informative aboutṽ − p n−1 (see (2.12)), and ii) rebalancing trading given that the remaining amount that the rebalancer actually needs to trade (i.e.,ã − θ R n−1 ) in general differs from the market makers expectation q n−1 .
The decomposition (3.1) provides some intuition for Figure 6 . Since α R n + β R n is positive but small until time N , the rebalancer trades a relatively small fraction of his expected trading gap q n−1 over time until time N at which time α R N + β R N = 1 and then he trades the full remaining gap. In addition, the fact that β R n is positive means that the rebalancer trades in the direction of his private information. He does this for two reasons: First, the largerã is relative to θ R n−1 (given q n−1 ) the more the rebalancer needs to trade to achieve his target compared to the market maker's expectation of his trading gap. Second, the smaller θ R n−1 is relative to q n−1 (givenã) the less the rebalancer has actually bought relative to the market maker's expectation, which, in turn, implies that, given the prior observed aggregate order flows, the more the insider has bought in expectation given the rebalancer's information. This implies, then, that the rebalancer believes that the market maker has underpriced the stock and, therefore, strategically buys stock. Here the realized stock valueṽ is 1.5, and the realized trading targetã is 1. There are 10 different randomly selected noise trader order path realizations. The rebalancer trades more at both the beginning and the end of the day compared to the middle of the day. The variability across paths indicates the extent to which our rebalancer's orders differ from the deterministic orders in Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014). Figure 8 shows the rebalancer's expected orders over the day given the particular realization of the trading targetã equal to 1. The expectations here are taken over the terminal stock priceṽ and the noise trader Brownian motion w. These expectations depend linearly on the realization of the trading targetã. The graphs show that the rebalancer's trading strategy also leads to a U -shaped pattern trading over the day. Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014) obtain a similar result in their model with short-lived information for the insiders and static trading for the rebalancer. In particular, with short-lived information, their insider is unable to trade dynamically over time, which allows the rebalancer to (imperfectly) separate his order from those of the insider. In contrast, in our model, the insider is able to trade dynamically too. Thus, we show that the U -shaped pattern of reblancing trading does not depend on the assumption of short-lived information. The various models in the literature on optimal execution with exogenuously specified price impact often produce U -shaped optimal strategies, see, e.g., Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011) and the many references therein. In that literature this type of strategy is referred to as sunshine trading and its optimality stems from exogenuously imposed liquidity resilience and replenishment properties. In contrast, liquidity in our equilibrium model is endogenous. Our rebalancer also finds it optimal to submit large orders at the beginning of the day so as to signal the size of the predictable component of his orders at the end of the day. The predictable orders at the end of the day are priced advantageously for the rebalancer for two reasons. First, prices only respond to order flow innovations, hence, predictable orders have a zero price impact. Secondly, trading by the informed investor over the course of the day reverses, in expectation, price pressure due to earlier uninformed rebalancing trading that is mistakenly interpreted as being informative aboutṽ.
Another interesting property of our model is that there are paths along which the rebalancer sometimes buys/sells more than his trading targetã at early dates and then winds his positions at later dates to achieve his trading target. The reason for this is that the rebalancer's orders reflect a combination of informed trading motives (aboutṽ) and uninformed rebalancing motives. This is illustrated in Figure 9 where the rebalancer's targetã is uncorrelated with the stock valueṽ (i.e., ρ = 0), and the specific realization ofã is close to 0. The graph on the left shows the rebalancer's cumulative stock positions over time (i.e., the θ R n s rather than the orders ∆θ R n ). In this example, the realization ofṽ is 0.25 and the realization ofã is 0.01. The rebalancer does not trade much at time 1 because he does not need to trade much to rebalance and because, initially, he does not have any stock valuation information. However, at time 2 the rebalancer trades based on whether -given the value information he gleans from being able to filter the time 1 order flow y 1 better than the market makers -he thinks the stock is over-or under-valued. Eventually, however, he has to unwind these earlier positions in order to achieve his realized trading target constraint θ R N =ã. The graph on the right in Figure 9 shows the corresponding equilibrium price path. We note that early in the day the price path is falling, and it is at those early low prices that the rebalancer starts buying. The pair of graphs in Figure 10 show the unconditional autocorrelation of the total order flow
over time. The graph on the right shows the autocorrelation for different trading target variances σ 2 a when the correlation ρ is zero. Although the absolute level of autocorrelation is low, there is a clear U -shaped pattern of higher order flow autocorrelation at the beginning and the end of the day (when, from Figure 8 , the rebalancer is trading more) with lower autocorrelation during the middle of the day (when the rebalancer trades less). Somewhat surprisingly, order flow autocorrelation can be negative in the middle of the day when the target-information correlation ρ is high. Figure 11 shows the unconditional standard deviation for the price changes over time; that is, E[(∆p n ) 2 ]. Kyle's model produces the solid (blue) line which is monotonically increasing whereas our model produces the U -shaped dotted lines (for various correlation parameters ρ and target variances σ 2 a ). In other words, our model produces equilibrium prices which are more volatile at the beginning and at the end of the trading day relative to the middle of the trading day. 
Conclusion
This paper has explored the equilibrium interactions between strategic dynamic informed trading, strategic dynamic portfolio rebalancing, price discovery, and liquidity in a multi-period Kyle (1985) market. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate these issues with both long-lived information and dynamic rebalancing given a terminal trading target.
There are many interesting possible extensions for future work. One possible extension is to model trading in continuous-time. Another possibility is to consider other forms of portfolio rebalancing constraints. A third extension is to relax the assumption that all investors are risk-neutral. For this extension, it would be natural to consider exponential utilities with different coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Finally, it would be interesting to extend the model to include multiple insiders and rebalancers.
A Proofs
A.1 Kalman filtering Lemma A.1. If Condition 2.2 and Condition 2.3 hold, then for n = 1, ..., N we havê
wherep is defined by (2.19) andq is defined by (2.20).
Proof. For n = 1, ..., N , we have the moment definitions in (2.21)-(2.23) where the starting values are in (2.24). We then define the processẑ n aŝ
These variablesẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 , ....,ẑ N are independent and satisfy σ(ẑ 1 , ...ẑ n ) = σ(ŷ 1 , ...ŷ n ).
The projection theorem for Gaussian random variables produces
To proceed, we first need to compute
By combining these expressions and by matching coefficients with (2.19) and (2.20) we find the lemma's statement equivalent to the following restrictions
Based on these expressions we can find the recursion for Σ
n , n = 1, ..., N , to be
Similarly, we find
A.2 Insider's optimization problem
In this section, we assume that Condition 2.2 and Condition 2.3 hold so we can define the "hat"-processes (2.16)-(2.20) as well as the insider's state variable processes (2.33).
We let p n be defined by (2.9) and we fix the rebalancer's strategy ∆θ R n by (2.7). We note that ∆θ R n depends on the insider's historical demands θ I k for k = 1, 2, ..., n − 1 even though the strategy (2.7) for the rebalancer is fixed.
We start with the following lemma which contains most of the calculations we will need later. and let ∆θ I n ∈ σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ), n = 1, ..., N , be arbitrary for the insider. Then for n = 1, ..., N we have the following two measurability properties
Based on this, we get the following expectations
n , X
n ∈ σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) and we have the dynamics
Proof. We first prove (A.11) by induction. We observe that
Suppose that (A.11) holds for n. Then, , y 1 , . .., y n ), σ(ṽ,ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n+1 ) = σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n ,ŷ n+1 ) = σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n , y n+1 + ∆θ
This proves (A.11). Next, we define the sequence of independent random variablesẑ n by (A.3) and we recall the property σ(ẑ 1 , ...,ẑ n ) = σ(ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n ). We can then compute the conditional expectations ofŷ n and y n as follows:
For the second equality in the second conditional expectation, we have usedθ R n−1 − θ R n−1 ∈ σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−2 ) which we established in (A.11). By using the propertŷ
n ∈ σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ). Furthermore, by the above we have
Since all involved random variables are jointly normal, we have the formula
(A.12)
By applying this formula we produce
Likewise we find via (A.12) 
where X
n , ..., X
n are defined in (2.33) and ∆p n is defined by (2.9) for ∆θ R n defined by (2.7). Furthermore, the insider's optimal trading strategy is given by (2.54).
Proof. We prove the theorem by the backward induction.o we suppose that (A.13) holds for n + 1. The n'th iteration then becomes
n σ(ṽ, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) .
(A.14)
Lemma A.2 shows that ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , . .., y n ) as well as σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n ) = σ(ã,ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n ) andŷ n − y n ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ).
(A.16)
n , Y
n , Y (5) n ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) and we have the dynamics
Proof. We start by proving (A.16) by induction. We observe that σ(ã, y 1 ) = σ(ã, β
We then suppose that (A.16) holds for n in which case we get , y 1 , . .., y n ), σ(ã,ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n+1 ) = σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n ,ŷ n+1 ) = σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n , y n+1 +ŷ n+1 − y n+1 ) = σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n+1 ).
For the above inclusion we used the facts ∆θ R n+1 ∈ σ(ã,ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n ), ∆θ R n+1 ∈ σ(ã, y 1 , ..., y n ), p n ,q n ∈ σ(ŷ 1 , ...,ŷ n ), p n , q n ∈ σ(y 1 , ..., y n ), and the induction hypothesis.
To compute the conditional expectations ofŷ n and y n we letẑ n be defined by (A. are defined in (2.36) and ∆p n is defined by (2.9) for ∆θ I n defined by (2.8). Furthermore, the rebalancer's optimal trading strategy is given by (2.60). 
